Any discrepancies or disputes over the interpretation or application of this agreement are resolved through consultations between the parties. The parties express the role played by the international community in facilitating political and technical agreements and welcome the assurances the parties have received of their support for the implementation of this agreement and its engagement with the Government of National Unity. Since legislative and regional elections have been postponed several times due to security concerns and political instability, a constitutional Loya Jirga (Great Assembly) cannot be held to formalize the CEO`s position, as promised in the NUG agreement. Proposals to end the political stalemate of the NUG opposition, led by former President Hamid Karzai and his allies, including early elections or a traditional Loya Jirga to determine a future government deal, will not appreciate either the president or the CEO. Ghani is wary of Karzai, while Abdullah is not willing to lose his ceo position; Both do not want to shorten NUG`s five-year term. The relationship between the President and the CEO cannot be described solely and in full by this agreement, but must be defined by the commitment of both parties to partnership, collegiality, cooperation and, above all, responsibility to the Afghan people. The President and CEO have an obligation to work together in this spirit of partnership. As the U.S. Embassy announced by email to reporters on September 21, 2014; The articles of the Constitution cited in the agreement are given after the text (added by AAN) Ghani and his team assert that the ultimate power, as enshrined in the Constitution, belongs to the president. They also refer to the text of the agreement which states that “the CEO`s position is created by presidential decree on the basis of Article 50 of the Constitution” and that the relationship is a “political partnership” under the “authority of the president.” While asserting that the CEO has no veto power over NUG`s appointments and policies, including his reform agenda, Abdullah and his team insist that the agreement clearly define a 50-50 power-sharing agreement, including veto powers. [fn] Crisis group interviews, senior palace officials, Abdullah aides and advisers, both Kabul, November 2016; “Agreement between the two campaign teams,” op. Hide Footnote Although the NUG agreement included commitments to maintain a constitutional Loya Jirga to formalize the CEO`s position as “Prime Minister” within two years, such an assembly cannot be formed without elections allowing the formation of district councils. [fn] In accordance with Article 110 of the Constitution, the Loya Jirga is composed of deputies and district councils.
Hide the footnote These elections and those in Parliament have not yet held. In addition, commitments to implement much-needed electoral reforms before the polls are conducted have not been hampered by the NUG`s internal mistrust and the power play between the executive and the legislature (see below). [fn] For an analysis of the crisis group on the electoral system, see the report on Afghanistan`s political transition, op. Quote; Briefings, No. 117, Afghanistan`s Elections Stalemate, February 23, 2011; 96, ElecAfghanistan: Elections and Governance Crisis, 25 November 2009; And the report, No. 171, Afghanistan`s electoral challenges, 24 June 2009.La NUG took several steps to launch the process, in particular the creation of a special commission on electoral reform (SERC) in June 2015.